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We are looking at ways in which both the accepted protocol and ciphers can be fine tuned for a queue manager,
Due to processing by IBM, this request was reassigned to have the following updated attributes:
Brand - WebSphere
Product family - Integration
Product - IBM MQ
For recording keeping, the previous attributes were:
Brand - WebSphere
Product family - Connectivity and Integration
Product - IBM MQ
With the existing implementation, MQ sends the list of supported ciphers but will only accept the one specified in the channel. The result is that an attacker isn't provided detail of the MQ configuration and must attempt to connect with different ciphers until finding the correct one. The result is evidence in the log of serial failed connection attempts that provide forensic analysis data for a breach investigation.
The RFE requests that MQ be modified to provide the attacker with the exact cipher specified in the channel, or the supported subset, thus eliminating or reducing the amount of forensic data available to the breach investigator.
The justification for this is that the PCI assessor doesn't understand that MQ is not HTTPS and therefore has a different security model which accounts for the "unexpected" behavior when using tools designed for HTTPS.
Do I have that about right? Has anyone asked the PCI assessor to justify the application of HTTPS standards to the completely different security model used by MQ?